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ABSTRACT

This article provides an outline for a new interpretation of the trial of the Templars, with special attention to the texts written by the instigators of the case, namely, Philip the Fair and his ministers. The trial had everything to do with the growth of the French monarchy. With the “discovery” and repression of the “Templars’ heresy,” the Capetian monarchy claimed for itself the mystic foundations of the papal theocracy. The Temple case was the last step of a process of appropriating these foundations, which had begun with the Franco-papal rift at the time of Boniface VIII. Being the ultimate defender of the Catholic faith, the Capetian king was now fully invested with a Christlike function that put him above the pope. What was at stake in the Templars’ trial was the establishment of a royal theocracy.

La politique de Philippe le Bel et de ses ministres peut être définie comme une vaste tentative pour exploiter l’Église au profit de la royauté.


The history of the celebrated and still mysterious trial against the Templars can be approached in two main ways. The first, which has always predominated, asks the question of the accused’s culpability. If they were at fault, what were they guilty of? Did they really commit the crimes against the faith that the king and pope accused them of? Was the Order of the Temple heretical? Were its members simply guilty of breaches of canon law that in themselves did not constitute heresy but were misinterpreted, deliberately amplified, or instrumentalized by Philip the Fair and his ministers? If this is the case,
what exactly were the infringements? Were they only minor offenses? Were they widespread in other religious communities or specific to the Templars, thus accounting for their singular fate? All these questions, even those the furthest removed from the point of view of the judges, derive from the accusations and events put in motion at the initiative of the Capetian king.

The second approach, which will ultimately be adopted here, is not based on a logic derived from the legal procedure of the time. This approach aims from the outset to question the motivations of the trial’s sole instigator, the king of France: Why did Philip the Fair and his principal counselors (in particular Guillaume de Nogaret and Guillaume de Plaisians) arrest and pursue the Templars, an attack in contravention of the rules of canon law, which also went behind Pope Clement V’s back and subsequently long defied his will? Why take such exceptional measures? The trial is perhaps the murkiest affair of the Middle Ages, and justifiably so with respect to the brutality and distortions at its heart. How can we explain the extreme relentlessness shown by the Capetian king and his entourage in the course of over six years in their quest to ensure that the “heresy” of the “perfidious Templars” was recognized by the accused themselves, by their ecclesiastical judges, by the pope, by the population of the kingdom of France, and by a universal Church council? Such questions have never been clearly answered—an astonishing circumstance in view of the fascination with which scholars have approached the trial for centuries and of the substantial bibliography this fascination has produced.

It is important to recognize that the two approaches outlined above are based on two different types of source material. The first approach focuses on records of the Templars’ judicial interrogations. In terms of volume, confessions and other statements represent by far the largest body of surviving documentation, which historians have long pored over and commented upon abundantly. The second approach, however, foregrounds the analysis of texts written in the king of France’s name to instigate, perform, and justify proceedings. This body includes (among other documents) accusations, letters to the pope, orders to inquisitors, and summons to the Estates General called upon to deal with the affair, as well as internal memos composed by the royal entourage. These documents have received scant attention, and their legal importance has often been misunderstood or ignored. They have been deemed too excessively infused by “ideology,” religious exultation, or the hypocrisy of royal counselors to offer any useful information. When taken seriously, however, the texts reveal the underlying logic governing the Templars’ trial. This logic had nothing to do
with the history of the order. It had everything to do, by contrast, with the Capetian monarchy.

Before offering certain suggestions for a fresh interpretation of the affair, I wish to retrace the main chronology of events and examine the accusations themselves.4

**THE EVENTS IN BRIEF FROM THE ARRESTS TO THE FINAL BURNINGS**

In an order dated September 14, 1307, Philip the Fair commanded the bailiffs and seneschals of his kingdom as well as appointed special agents to commence secret preparations to arrest the Templars. The sole justification and legal foundation for the king’s decision was the order’s so-called ill repute. Crimes against the faith had supposedly been imputed to the members of the order for some time. The rules for a criminal inquiry according to canon law, first instituted in the Church in the early thirteenth century, meant that judicial procedures could be initiated without the intervention of an accuser if a judge decreed the existence of a *diffamatio* (or *infamia*) supporting the existence of reprehensible acts.5

Rumors of crimes committed by the Knights Templar had, however, mostly been spread by the king of France himself and by his entourage, within a very specific context: the king’s delicate negotiations with Clement V. The Knights Templar’s “ill repute” was first evoked in Lyon, late 1305, during the first meeting between the newly elected pope and Philip the Fair. The Knights Templar had been subject to sporadic slander before, but no more than any other order. Up to this point, judicial authorities had never deemed such slander worthy of attention, and it had never constituted a *diffamatio*, meaning that no court had seen fit to accord it the legal value of an *infamia* liable to initiate legal proceedings.6

By drawing Clement V’s attention to the unsavory rumors supposedly circulating about the order (which was placed directly under papal jurisdiction), the Capetian king’s entourage sought to exert pressure on the pope in a show of force related to a completely different issue: the resolution of the conflict that had violently pitted Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII against each other several years earlier,7 an episode that is well documented.8 In 1302–3, at the peak of tussles over papal legal prerogatives within the kingdom of France, the king had dared to arrange to have the pope declared a heretic, letting his counselors call a universal Church council in his name with the aim of judging and deposing Boniface. While preparing
to excommunicate the Capetian king in return, the pope was briefly arrested at his residence in Anagni by Sciarra Colonna and Guillaume de Nogaret, Philip the Fair’s envoy. Boniface died shortly after, and his successor, Benedict XI, whose pontificate lasted less than a year (October 1303 to July 1304), had agreed solely to lift the canonical sanctions on the king. Philip now demanded that Clement V, crowned in November 1305, not only lift the anathemas on the royal counselors, accused for the 1302–3 attack (especially Nogaret), but also open a posthumous trial to prove Boniface’s heresy. The deceased pope’s body would then be exhumed and burned in keeping with the prescribed punishment for impenitent heretics. Thus the king of France’s earlier actions against an errant pope would be recognized by the Apostolic See itself as salutary for the preservation of the faith.

In 1306–7, while Clement V was firmly resisting such radical demands, the royal entourage’s accusations against the Knights Templar became increasingly insistent. Following a fresh round of negotiations with the king at Poitiers in spring 1307, the rumors increased to the point where the pope, at the request of the Knights Templar leadership itself, discussed initiating an *inquisitio veritatis*. Recourse to the “inquiry of truth” thus appeared necessary to dispel what the Curia considered to be a slanderous *infamatio*. After Clement V himself alerted the king about this process in a letter of August 24, 1307, the king and his counselors reacted with an extraordinary resolve. They would go ahead with the launch of a royal procedure as quickly as possible, so as to preempt the papal inquiry—which, once set in motion, would have removed control over the affair from their hands.

Then, on October 13, with excellent coordination and to the total surprise of the targeted individuals, the king’s agents arrested all the Knights Templars in the kingdom. Among them were the principal leaders of the order, including Grand Master Jacques de Molay, dignitaries who had recently arrived from Cyprus (where the order had been headquartered since the loss of the Holy Land) in response to a papal summons. Clement V was then residing in France, where he had been occupied since his coronation by negotiations with the Capetian king.

Philip the Fair’s actions represented a serious and unprecedented assault on papal prerogatives. The king and his counselors had already committed a major infringement on Church privileges a few years earlier in 1301 when they had seized the bishop of Pamiers (and Boniface VIII’s good friend), Bernard Saissset, on the pretext that he was a traitor and a heretic. This act set in motion an escalating series of events leading to the arrest at Anagni.
But at that point only one prelate had been removed from the Roman Church’s monopoly over judgment of members of the high clergy (even if it was a prelate, like Saisset, who championed the universal jurisdiction exercised by the papacy). When, on October 13, 1307, the king arrested all members of an exempt monastic order subject only to the Apostolic See’s authority, Philip the Fair had taken an initiative that was not only illegal but difficult even to conceptualize within the worldview held by most contemporaries. To demonstrate the exceptional necessity of such a measure, irrefutable proof of the reality and enormity of the order’s crimes had to be obtained as quickly as possible. In other words, confessions were necessary, leading to immediate recourse to torture.

After several days of interrogations, most of the Templar dignitaries admitted to some of the crimes of which they had been accused. Such haste contrasts greatly with the usually slow criminal investigations against churchmen during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But in this situation, thanks to the indulgence of the inquisitor of France and royal devotee, Guillaume de Paris, the jurisdiction of the Church acted under the king’s direct control, in fact if not in law. By October 24, Jacques de Molay had already confessed that the order’s reception ceremonies included a ritual denial of Christ. Immediately he was forced to repeat his confession in public, accompanied by other leaders who had also made confessions. An official statement was extorted from Molay, which the king quickly sent to the sovereign princes of Christendom. Molay also had to sign letters addressed to all Templars, ordering them to confess. Before the end of autumn 1308, almost all the prisoners whose depositions have survived to the present day (138 interrogated in Paris, 94, in the provinces) had at least partly confessed their guilt.

Caught unawares and outraged, Clement V sought to regain control of the affair. In the presence of two of the pope’s cardinals dispatched to Paris in December 1307, certain Templars, including Jacques de Molay, revoked their confessions. Because Philip the Fair had effectively refused—despite his statements of intention—to return the prisoners to the Church’s custody, the pope decided to suspend the kingdom’s inquisitors from office. The king had used them as cover for his actions, allowing him later to brazenly present himself as the devoted instrument of the Church and even of the Roman Pontiff himself. With this suspension of the ecclesiastical judges in January or February 1308, the procedure was halted.

Philip the Fair reacted by increasing pressure on the pope, and at the end of May 1308, he traveled to Poitiers, where the Curia was residing. With
the royal army threatening, negotiations were held there for two months. The primary goal of the king and his counselors from this point on was to gain papal approval for the king’s offensive against the Templars, but the demand for a procedure against Boniface VIII was also forcefully renewed as well. After several weeks of resistance, the pope finally gave up defending the Knights Templar when he was offered the chance to preserve what, from his point of view, was the heart of the matter—the jurisdictional supremacy of the Apostolic See (even if this supremacy was only a facade).12

For the inquiry to resume, Philip the Fair had effectively accepted that it would henceforth be governed directly by papal authority. In exchange for this merely formal concession, Clement V acknowledged the crimes already confessed by the accused in a series of bulls issued between July 5 and August 12, 1308, and launched two inquiries. One, against the members of the order, was entrusted to local episcopal commissions and provincial councils (over which the king, in France, could exercise his control). The other, against the order itself, was reserved for papal commissions (the French commission, the most important, would be convened in Paris, its members selected by the king). A General Council to examine the results of the procedures was called for 1310 at Vienne, that is, not in France, as the royal counselors had demanded, but, as a compromise, close to the kingdom while still in imperial territory.

The difficulties encountered by inquisitors in obtaining confessions from members of the order outside of France made it necessary to postpone the date of the assembly, and it finally opened in October 1311. The Church Fathers assembled from all over Christendom deemed the proof against the Knights Templar with which they had been presented to be seriously lacking; only the French prelates, under the influence of the king, were of the opposite opinion. Responding to pressure from the Capetian king’s counselors and army, the pope applied a purely administrative measure to suppress the order without passing judgment, all in an attempt to quell the council’s opposition. The order was effectively dissolved “not by judicial sentence, but by provision, by virtue of apostolic authority,” its “defamation” deemed too great to allow the order to continue its existence after the scandal. No decision was reached concerning the reality of their crimes, and the Templars’ fate was left to the decision of provincial councils, with the exception of the order’s high dignitaries, who, after a long wait, were abandoned by Clement V to the judgment of a Parisian ecclesiastical assembly, naturally under royal control. On March 14, 1314, the assembly condemned four of the order’s leaders to life imprisonment.
At the last minute, two of the four, Jacques de Molay and the commander of Normandy, Geoffroy de Charnay, proclaimed their innocence, and that very evening Philip the Fair sent them to their deaths at the stake, without waiting for the ecclesiastical judges’ decision.

**INQUISITORIAL PROCEDURES, INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMISM, AND HISTORICAL METHOD: INTERPRETING THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE TEMPLE**

The accusations laid down in the arrest warrant of September 14, 1307, can be summarized in five main points:

1. To be admitted into the order, every Templar had to take part in a secret ritual, a reception ceremony requiring him, it is said, to deny Christ three times, each time insulting his body by spitting on a crucifix. Ultimately, this proved to be the main accusation.

2. During the initiation ceremony, new Templars had to kiss the officiant not on the mouth, as was traditional during rituals of allegiance (to symbolize the exchange of breath), but “at the base of the spine,” a euphemism for a kiss on the anus, the sign of a pact with the forces of evil and entry into a demonic sect.

3. The newly initiated Templar was also told he should not refuse to engage in sodomy with members of the order who might solicit it. This special rule (designed to protect the brothers against the temptation to fornicate with others outside the community) was supposedly written into the order’s secret statutes, making “unnatural” couplings frequent among the warrior-monks.

4. The Templars worshipped an idol.

5. Finally, the priests of the order celebrated Mass without consecrating the host, another means of attacking the body of Christ attributed to the Temple. Christ was offended not only in his representation on the crucifix but also in the sacramental form of the Eucharist.

The bull *Faciens misericordiam* by which Clement V opened the papal procedures against the order and its members in August 1308 was accompanied by two lists of 88 and 127 accusations. Drawn up by Philip the Fair’s counselors, the lists developed the five original charges by specifying a great number of scandalous details and in actuality only added three further accusations: illicit acquisition of wealth (a point that remained marginal),
nonbelief in all the sacraments, and absolution from sins during chapter meetings granted by dignitaries of the order who were not priests. Only this last accusation rested on any verifiable facts, but it was a mere misinterpretation of canon law, confusing absolution from infractions of the rule of the order with absolution from sin. This error was not widespread and did not constitute a crime against the faith.¹³

These accusations essentially drew on old stereotypes about heretics, notably those deployed in 1233 by Gregory IX’s famous bull Vox in rama. In 1302 and 1303, Nogaret and Plaisians had already accused Boniface VIII of sodomy and nonbelief in the Eucharist. Their posthumous procedure against the Caetani pope in 1310 also featured charges of idolatry and adherence to a heretical sect and was no doubt contaminated by the Templar affair.

During the four years of the inquiry, the Templars of France confessed to the accusations to varying extents and in varying degrees of detail according to the harshness of the tortures inflicted (which actually killed several dozen of the accused) and each individual’s capacity for resistance. The confession of denial of Christ when joining the order clearly constituted the bare minimum required by inquisitors, and this was the charge to which most confessed. Brothers were asked to acknowledge the existence of such a ritual, which had already been admitted to by the grand master, and they protested their personal good faith by pointing to the constraints to which they were subjected during their initiation. Thus they were able to certify that they had denied ore sed non corde—“with the mouth but not with the heart”—in the hope of bringing their torments to an end without compromising themselves too much.

The often long transcripts of the depositions are sometimes rich in striking details and have aroused fascination for centuries. Even today, some historians strive diligently to cross-examine the confessions and delicately evaluate their reliability.¹⁴ The claim to be able to separate truth from falsehood in such texts is, however, illusory, because they were produced by an implacable judicial machine designed to grind down the will of the accused.¹⁵ Some historians also explore the surviving sources left by the order from the beginning of the twelfth century in the hope of finding indications confirming or explaining any of the confessed infractions recorded by the inquisitors. But such attempts to uncover ambiguities in the order’s practices that might have encouraged the royal accusations are far from convincing. They result in, at best, dubious,¹⁶ and inevitably impressionistic findings, depending on the mood or sensibilities of their authors. Thus,
in 2004, Jonathan Riley-Smith concluded that the “filthy kiss” during the order’s initiation was indeed a practice in certain cases but is likely to have been no more than jocular horseplay; the charge of worshipping the head of an idol would have stemmed from the Templar’s real predilection for reliquaries in the form of a head; while the accusation of sodomy would have been tied to the obligation for each Templar to share his bed with a traveling brother if no other bed was available in the commandery; and so on.\(^7\) On the whole Riley-Smith, in a highly arbitrary way, is “inclined to believe that in some commanderies blasphemous demands were being made of postulants at the time of, or shortly after, their reception into the order. The practice was probably to be found in a minority of commanderies and among a few receptors in France, but it was not confined to them.”\(^8\) The profanations would have been committed only in the communities of France and Italy; those of Germany, the Iberian Peninsula (including Roussillon), and the British Isles, on the other hand, were “clear.” Such a geography of guilt results from extensive probabilistic analysis based on the author’s reading of the depositions, but Riley-Smith does not seem to realize that his cartography corresponds precisely to the use of torture. Hence his final remark that “given present knowledge, it is impossible to establish when or why such odd behavior could have crept into a great and powerful order of the Church.”\(^9\) I shall reply to Riley-Smith’s claims below by suggesting that it is actually very possible to understand why this “odd behavior” was attributed to the Templars by the king of France.

Riley-Smith allows himself to be so dominated by the procedural logic at work in the sources that he ultimately doubts the validity of retractions made by some of the accused on the pretext that they would have been elicited by threats from brothers\(^{10}\)—a startling reversal, since the confessions themselves were most certainly obtained under torture. Riley-Smith finally justifies the torture inflicted upon the accused with two arguments: first, that the supposed “obsessive” secrecy cultivated by the order and the oath given by the brothers on entry would have prevented them from speaking. However, there was nothing particularly secret about the order compared with the practices of other orders. Furthermore, any misgivings about confession should have been removed by the supposedly illegal manner of the novices’ vows and by the nature of the oaths taken before their judges, which, by contrast, had legal weight—to which we could add the order for a swift confession extracted from the grand master. And second, according to Riley-Smith, the convincing character of the results proves the utility of torture: “Interrogators had come to believe that they had to counteract
scrupulousness with force if need be and the statements of some brothers appeared to bear them out.”22 In this circular logic there are perhaps echoes of the justifications given nowadays for the use of torture to safeguard nation-states and their good citizens. The naivety with which some historians approach inquisitorial procedures stems not only from misunderstandings of their functioning but probably also from a kind of visceral tendency to legitimate the actions of state power in general.23 In another example, Anne Gilmour-Bryson recently devoted an article to questioning whether the trial system implemented against the Templars was genuinely adequate to attain the truth of the facts,24 as if this was doubtless its sole objective.

At its worst, research centering on the trial transcripts results in semischolarly fantasy in its desire to establish the truth of the crimes. Based on her own very subjective readings of the depositions, Barbara Frale thus imagines the existence of a mysterious *codice ombra*, a secret ritual that would have forced the new Templars to commit more or less sacrilegious acts in order to test their resistance,25 while recently, she “discovered” that the Templars also worshipped the famous Shroud of Turin.26

The persistence of such methods across the ages can also be explained by the weight of probability inherent in all testimony,27 thus described long ago by Jeremy Bentham: “That there exists in man a propensity to believe in testimony, is matter of fact, matter of universal experience; and this, as well on every other occasion, and in any private station, as on a judicial occasion.” A witness always inspires spontaneous agreement in the listener, at least initially, because “belief is the ordinary state of a man’s mind” and “to produce disbelief requires some particular assignable consideration, operating in the character of a special cause.”28

The reasons to doubt the truth of the confessions wrenched from the Templars are manifold. To me, the obstinacy with which historians have been pursuing traces of genuine canonical irregularities reveals how disturbing and even unbearable is the idea that the entire trial had absolutely no basis in fact. Hence scholars’ refusal or inability, even seven centuries later, to free themselves entirely from the logic imposed by the *inquisitio veritatis* demonstrates the power of the procedure itself. Rather than recognize the absolutely arbitrary nature of state institutions during the Templar affair in all its violence, historians often rely on a mode of denial familiar to psychoanalysts: “I know, but still. . . .”29 Convinced that there is no smoke without fire in the Templar affair, scholars may seek to preserve, in spite of everything, a reassuring image of state institutions as the ultimate guarantors of truth and justice.
Indeed, everything suggests that the Templars were innocent. Or, rather, nothing, apart from their arrest and forced confessions, justifies belief in their guilt. No proof corroborating confessions has ever been discovered. No confession, as far as is known, was ever received without compulsion. Outside France, the many investigations undertaken against the brothers ended in failure, with only a few exceptions, especially in Italy, precisely in those rare cases where torture was deployed. There is such a marked contrast between the abundance of results in the Capetian kingdom and the unconvincing results elsewhere because other sovereigns did not share Philip the Fair’s motivations. The princes of Christendom reacted with skepticism to the king of France’s letters urging them to act. The only sovereign to quickly adopt a hostile attitude toward the Templars, the king of Aragon, James II, showed no interest in repressing their purported crimes against the faith. For him, it was another chance to seize control of the order’s numerous assets and fortresses of great strategic importance to his kingdom.

Philip the Fair and his counselors prevented the Templars from defending themselves by any means possible, however illegal and however brutal. When the order’s dignitaries appeared before the papal commission in Paris, November 1309, Nogaret and Plaisians were also in attendance. The pair were openly threatening, intimidating the accused into abandoning their plea. Early in 1310, a large resistance movement emerged among the accused. Soon, there were some six hundred brothers committed to defending the Templars before the commission. Their representatives, Renaud of Provins and Peter of Bologna, initially suggested that Philip the Fair had been misled when launching the accusations. When the king’s good faith was put in doubt, radical measures of dissuasion neatly blocked all further developments in that direction. On May 12, 1310, the archbishop of Sens, Philip of Marigny, sent fifty-four Templars defending the order to the stake after a summary judgment. A brother of Enguerran de Marigny, one of the principal royal counselors, Archbishop Philip had been appointed at Philip the Fair’s request a few months earlier; he was, in other words, a Capetian devotee. The May 12 burnings were justified by legal argument. The summarily condemned brothers had previously confessed before diocesan commissions instituted to judge individuals. As they had revoked their confessions, declaring the order innocent, the archbishop and his assessors judged them as relapsed heretics. The desired effect had thus been achieved, and a climate of fear was instilled; other defenders of the order subsequently abandoned their efforts en masse. The papal
commission then merely wrapped up its hearings, now entirely unfavorable to the Templars, before sending its reports to the pope in June 1311.

The Council of Vienne’s attitude also confirms the Templars’ innocence, if such confirmation is even required. In light of the investigation’s results and despite Clement V’s efforts, the Fathers refused to find the accused guilty, urging instead the organization of a Templar defense. This was something the pope was keen to avoid at any cost, as it threatened his delicate relationship with Philip the Fair. A judicial solution was thus not feasible, which hence explains the choice of suppressing the order on administrative grounds. The bull *Vox in excelso* promulgated this “provision” and stated that it had the council’s approval. The pope, meanwhile, forbade all discussion. A plenary session of the council was held at Vienne on April 3, 1312, in the presence of the king of France, to lay down the terms of the provision to the Fathers. Before the reading, a solemn warning was given to all present: anyone who dared to speak up afterward would be instantly struck with major excommunication.

**THE PERSECUTION OF THE TEMPLARS AND THE PONTIFICALIZATION OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY**

In 2005, Alain Demurger formulated a comprehensive interpretation of the fall of the Temple: he concluded, in short, that the order seems to have been a “scapegoat” that “paid for all the international military orders,” which “had no place in the modern State.” By the end of the thirteenth century, these orders, with their hierarchical internal organization and their direct submission to the papacy, had become “foreign bodies” within kingdoms and constituted “obstacles to the development of centralized monarchies.” This analysis is satisfying on a structural level but does not account for the specific course of events: Why the Knights Templar? Why Philip the Fair? Why the trial for heresy?

Of the many explanations proposed, none seems satisfactory. There is nothing to corroborate, for example, the old hypothesis that the king’s main objective was to appropriate the order’s assets. The order’s image had certainly declined with the diminishment, then loss, of the last Christian holdings in the Holy Land in 1291. The order suddenly appeared ineffective and poorly suited to the requirements of a reconquest. Moreover, its banking activities were also a possible cause for enmity. The Order of the Temple was not especially unpopular, however, contrary to some views. It is true
that certain leaders may have considered the order redundant. In fact, the old plan to fuse the Templars with the Knights Hospitaler, already raised at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, had reemerged shortly before the investigation. Through such a reorganization, Philip the Fair hoped to take control of a single international military order attached to the Capetians. Any holy enterprise undertaken by this new knighthood against the infidels would thus have confirmed the French monarchy’s special mission to defend the faith. But Jacques de Molay opposed the integration of the Templars into a new order, apparently with a certain lack of tact. His refusal, however, is no more decisive than other factors for understanding the affair. Like other factors, it simply points to the king of France’s unfavorable disposition toward the Templars. In spite of centuries of speculation, the motivation for the trials remains a mystery.

To clarify this “mystery of iniquity,” to use Ernest Renan’s expression, we have to consider the serious crisis in the relationship between the king of France and the papacy that began in 1301. This conflict took the form of a series of three trials culminating in the persecution of the Templars. Philip the Fair first openly flouted papal prerogatives by arresting the bishop of Pamiers, Bernard Saisset, and bringing him before his council on fabricated charges of high treason and heresy. This was a blatant provocation, as Saisset was Boniface VIII’s personal protégé and a staunch defender of the jurisdictional superiority of the Holy See within the kingdom. Boniface’s violent reaction, already mentioned above, led in turn to accusations of heresy against the pope and to his arrest in his residence, followed by an attempted posthumous trial, which was halted only with great difficulty by Clement V.

In many ways, the three affairs of the years 1301–14 are part of the same sequence, and the similarities among them are strong. In each case, “ill repute” (infamia) was deployed to justify royal proceedings, and in each case, the “enormity” of the crimes was similarly emphasized, requiring extreme urgency and radical intervention to justify serious violations of papal jurisdiction. There is in each case the same imitation of papal rhetoric—to the point of parody—in royal letters. And, above all, Nogaret and Plaisians deployed the same exalted efforts to posit Philip the Fair as the supreme guarantor of the faith, above the pope.

It was in the course of the Saisset affair that, to the profit of the king of France, Nogaret first turned the main legal-theological arguments developed by the thirteenth-century papacy to claim “plenitude of power”—that is, absolute sovereignty. These arguments were driven by the imperatives
of the fight against heresy. As a “Vicar of Christ,” that is, Christ’s representative on Earth, the pope in effect carried out the mission of the Son of God by preserving the purity of the faith, the condition sine qua non for the common salvation. From this mission stemmed his superiority over all other earthly powers. In accusing Bernard Saisset of heresy, Nogaret created the chance to affirm the right of the Capetian king to replace the pope, if necessary, in his Christlike function. Henceforth, “what [was] committed against God, against the faith or against the Roman Church, the king consider[ed] committed against himself.” To reach this conclusion, formulated at the moment when the bishop of Pamiers’s arrest required justification to Boniface VIII, Nogaret first cited word for word a crucial passage from the decretal *Vergentis in senium* (1199), in which Innocent III had equated heresy to the crime of imperial lèse-majesté: “to injure eternal majesty is more serious than to injure temporal majesty.” In Nogaret’s text, the effect of this famous formula is reversed to equate royal jurisdiction to that of the pope, by implicitly assimilating the Capetian king’s majesty to divine majesty. Seventy years earlier, the *Constitutions of Melfi* (1231) had made the same reversal, based on the same passage in the decretal *Vergentis*, to the benefit of Frederick II.

Ernst Kantorowicz, in a well-known article entitled “Mysteries of State,” spoke of “pontificalism” to designate the religious underpinnings of royal absolutism at the end of the Middle Ages and into the modern era. If he had looked more closely at the French case, and particularly at the judicial, administrative, and diplomatic sources of the history of conflicts between Philip the Fair and the papacy, he might have observed an extraordinarily explicit process of royal “pontificalization.”

A second phase started several months after the Saisset affair, when Plaisians and Nogaret, in accusing Boniface VIII himself of being a heretic, declared the office of Vicar of Christ vacant due to the failings of its holder. In this way, they could posit Philip the Fair as savior of the Church by encouraging him to call a universal council to judge Boniface. In his articles of accusation, Nogaret goes so far as to present the king as an “angel of God” charged in the name of heaven with punishing deviations from the faith committed by the one who should have been its ultimate guarantee:

I beseech you, excellent prince, lord Philippe, by the grace of God king of the Franks, that—like the angel of the Lord long ago standing in the way with his sword drawn in his hand [Num. 22:31], as the prophet Balaam advanced to curse the people of the Lord—you, who are...
anointed for the execution of justice and thus like an angel of God, minister of power and of your office, should oppose with a drawn sword this impious bringer of pestilence, worse than Balaam, so that he cannot carry through the evil against the people that he intends.51

Finally, Philip the Fair’s “discovery” of the “Templars’ heresy,” supposedly threatening all of Christendom, aimed to impose the French king’s superiority and control definitively over Boniface’s successors. The texts written by the royal entourage on this occasion are crammed with biblical references. The exaltation of the sacred function vested in the Capetian king here reaches its height. The king’s direct relation to God, with no papal intermediary, is permanently affirmed.

In the admission of guilt that Jacques de Molay was forced to sign on October 25, 1307, for example, the royal counselors made him affirm that “the Author of light, to whom nothing is hidden”—that is, God—had revealed the crimes of the Templars “by the mediating ministry of the very Christian king, lord Philip.”52 The king, in a letter sent to the prelates of France to summon them to the Estates General of 1308, exposed the crimes of the Templars while declaring himself, and without making any reference to the pope!, as “promoter of this affair of Christ, as it pertains to our majesty.”53 He thus commanded the archbishops, bishops, and abbots of the kingdom to join him at the assembly of Tours “in the name of the ties of fidelity that bind you to God and to us, who are in charge of His interest in this affair” (“qui gerimus Ejus negocium in hac parte”).54 How can this phrase not be tied to the phrase “what is committed against God . . . , the king considers committed against himself” emanating from Nogaret’s quill during the Saisset affair?55 Before Clement V, during a consistory held at Poitiers on May 29, 1309, in the presence of the king, Plaisians presented the Capetian monarch as the “temporal vicar of Christ in his kingdom,” “chosen by divine Providence” to intervene against the Templars.56 Philip the Fair was declared in no uncertain terms the “minister of God,” personally “required to account to Him for the defense of the Church.”57 The following June 14, in similar circumstances, the same légiste pushed his audacity to the point of asserting that Christ had twice carried out “miraculous work”: first by choosing a pope who was French (Clement V was from Gascony) and thus a product of the kingdom “chosen and blessed by God above all other kingdoms of the world” and second by causing Saint Peter’s latest successor to reside in the kingdom of France. In this way, the Savior had effectively sought to join the pope and the Capetian king “in heart
and body” so that “the power of one and that of the other, united together, would fight for Him” against the Templars.58 At the same time, this desire for a forced union also expressed itself in the Capetian insistence that the papacy permanently install itself in France—a deadly embrace, in some sense, that would complete the appropriation of the papal theocracy’s specific model of mystical sovereignty.

To arrive at this point, the royal counselors had caused sacred history to be replayed, to the detriment of the Templars. Just as they had done earlier to the detriment of Boniface VIII (notably when they had evoked Balaam and the angel), they added a chapter to sacred history in which the hero was the king of France. The denial of Christ by the Templars, the spitting on the crucifix, and other sacrileges (in particular the refusal to consecrate the host during Mass)59 were in effect nothing less than a renewal of the Passion in which “they crucified once again our Lord” (“Dominum nostrum iterum crucifigunt”), in the course of which the Savior suffered offenses “more serious than those received on the Cross.” Such were the terms used in the order of arrest,60 the work of Nogaret.61 And in his discourse of May 29, 1308, before Clement V and Philip the Fair, Plaisians presented the royal initiative against the Templars as the greatest victory achieved by Jesus himself since his death on the Cross.62 Moreover, it is certainly no accident that the arrest order was issued on September 14, 1307, the exact day of the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. The choice of a Friday—the day of the crucifixion—for the arrests may well also have had a religious significance.63


If the repression of a heretical threat was necessary to transform the king of France into a pontiff, why was the Order of the Temple chosen rather than another order? Why not another group that could have been accused of forming a sect? Besides the order’s weaknesses mentioned above, there was certainly another factor, perhaps the decisive one, related to the eschatological climate of the early years of the fourteenth century and in particular to the mystical bent of Nogaret and Plaisians. According to the letter summoning the prelates to the Estates General of 1308, the “damnable sect of the Templars” had “the substance of the Antichrist”—while in the letter summoning the towns, the king declared that “the Catholic faith,
through which we establish what we are in Christ,” is “all our substance.”

The hypothesis of an eschatological sense underlying the Templar affair will require further research before it can be fully supported. Only some suggestions can be made here.

According to the prophetic literature, the Antichrist was announced in the Apocalypse of St. John and would settle in the Temple of Jerusalem—from which the Order of the Templars took its name. As early as the middle of the tenth century, Adso of Montier-en-Der was predicting that the Antichrist would reconstruct the Temple. His *Libellus de Antichristo* was, moreover, translated into the vernacular at the initiative of the Templars themselves, as with a number of other works of the same nature. In a general way, an eschatological ambiance enveloped the order from its origins at the beginning of the twelfth century. At that time, the Cistercian Isaac de l’Étoile, violently opposed to this “novelty” that allowed monks to shed blood (even that of infidels), had actually accused the military orders, the first one being the Templar Order, of favoring the cruel plans of the future “son of perdition,” that is, of the Antichrist.

Theories about the coming of the Antichrist were widely diffused throughout the thirteenth century with the texts of Joachim of Fiore and his numerous imitators. These theories were given a new vigor at the end of the century by the writings of Arnau of Villanova (among others). In 1300, Arnau was sent to Paris by the king of Aragon to negotiate with the Capetian king for the rights over Val d’Aran. On Philip the Fair’s side, Nogaret was one of the counselors in charge of this affair, which may explain the choice of Arnau as an ambassador, since the two men had known each other in Montpellier in the first half of the 1290s. During his Parisian stay, Arnau was arrested by the bishop’s officer upon request of the theologians of the Sorbonne because of the opinions expressed in his treatise *De tempore adventus Antichristi*, which he had presented to the university. At that point, Nogaret himself intervened to free Arnau from jail. More specifically, in a long list of documents recovered from Nogaret’s home by the royal administration a few months after his death, one item records “writings in a roll, that is, conclusions drawn from Daniel’s prophecy to prove the quantity of time” (“plura scripta in rotulo, videlicet conclusiones ex prophecia Danielis ad probandum temporis quantitatem”). These “conclusions” can be identified either with Arnau’s *De tempore adventus Antichristi* or with a second treatise he wrote on the same topic and sent to the king of France in 1301, the *De cymbalis Ecclesiæ*. The purpose of both works was to compute in chronological terms the “70 weeks prophecy” mentioned in Daniel
This prophecy announced that “the abomination of desolation” would settle in the Temple before the final extermination of the Antichrist: “Et erit in Templo abominatio desolationis.” In his De tempore, Arnau explains, for instance, that “the abomination of desolation of the faithful,” as mentioned in Daniel’s text, “is nothing other than a cult abominable to God. Thus, by ‘abomination of desolation,’ one should not only understand the Antichrist in person, but also all his imitators.” In Arnau’s opinion, Daniel thus referred to a time “when in reprobate Jerusalem there would be a cult abominable to God, on account of the domination that a wicked people would have there.”

Nothing proves that this precise passage in the treatise, more than any other text of the same type written by Arnau or another author, would have directly influenced Nogaret and the royal entourage. But one can easily see how this kind of idea could be transposed to their own time. In this case, the “cult abominable to God” could obviously be assimilated to the heresy and idolatry with which the Templars were reproached. They could be seen as the “wicked people” whose final defeat, with the overthrow of the Temple (eversio Templi), would mark the victory over the Antichrist.

In the history of the Hebrews, the destruction of the Temple marks the end of an alliance between God and the chosen people before the advent of a new alliance. And in the New Testament, Jesus predicts the destruction of the Temple to his disciples (Matt. 24:2). A passage of John assimilates Christ’s sacrifice itself to a destruction of the Temple, since Jesus said to the Jews: “Destroy this Temple, and in three days I will raise it up,” talking about his own body and hence predicting the Resurrection (John 2:19–21). In the Apocalypse, moreover, John says that he “saw no Temple” in the celestial Jerusalem, “for the Lord God Almighty is the Temple thereof, and the Lamb.”

Thanks to the new alliance founded by Christ’s Passion, the Temple of the earthly Jerusalem had no further reason to exist, since, from now on, the true Temple was the body of Christ—the same body the Templars were said to have offended in the forms of the crucifix and host.

In short, the motivations of eschatology and the pontificalization of the monarchy could easily converge from the point of view of Nogaret and the other légistes: their great intention in causing sacred history to be replayed and continued in the trials and investigations of 1301–14 was indeed to found a mystical alliance between God and his new vicar in France, the Capetian king. There is other evidence, it should be noted, for the interest of the royal counselors in this theme of an alliance. Thus the preface of a letter of inquest against the seneschal of Carcassonne prepared in 1309, repeats—here again—the terms of a well-known text from Innocent III,
in this case the decretal Licet Heli (1199). In proceeding against a corrupt officer, Philip the Fair imitated the pope when the latter had raged, 110 years earlier, against a simoniacal abbot. To underline the salutary character of his action, he recalled the misfortune of Heli. According to the Book of Samuel, God had chastised the great preacher and supreme judge of Israel, Heli, who was incapable of correcting the misbehavior of his sons and servants, by causing the Ark of the Covenant to be lost to the Hebrews. In 1308, during his discourse of June 14 before Clement V, Plaisians had already invoked the figure of Heli to threaten the pope and get him to abandon his position of obstructing the process against the Templars.

In forcing the pope to recognize the divine election of the Capetian king to the position of supreme defender of the faith—an election demonstrated by the discovery of the Templars’ heresy in France and not elsewhere and by virtue of the fact that the victory against this heresy was won by Philip the Fair and not another—the stakes were far from purely theoretical. The affair of the Templars was decisive for the transformation of the kingdom into a unified and autonomous entity in the form of an indissoluble political and religious community, cemented by a Christian faith whose guarantor was the king: that is, a royal church (still short of a Gallican Church—that is, of a national ecclesiastical institution). Thus the first true Estates General of the kingdom, summoned to Tours at the beginning of May 1308, did not have the function of consenting to a tax as was the case elsewhere in the West when other princes summoned this type of assembly starting in the thirteenth century. Representatives from the whole kingdom were called together at Tours only to inform them of the danger of heresy, to bring them together in approval of the salutary actions of Philip the Fair, and to have them elect delegates who would then accompany the king to the pope’s audience at Poitiers and demand that Clement restart the procedure. Already in 1302 and 1303, assemblies had been summoned to support the accusations against Boniface VIII. But in spring 1308, the event took on unprecedented dimensions; besides the nobility and the clergy, all communities holding “fairs or markets” had to be represented. More than a mere propaganda operation, this was a moment of intense celebration of the kingdom constituted as a body and as a church: a body-church to be defended, under the absolute authority of the king, against the heretical enemy.

Moreover, the royal insistence on the Templars’ offenses to the body of Christ were perhaps not unrelated to a process of constructing the kingdom of France as a mystical body, the head of which was the king. The idea that Christian society in its entirety formed a mystical body for which Christ
and his representative on earth, the pope, formed the “head,” entitled to command all the other “members,” was fairly recent. Boniface VIII and the theologians of his entourage had put it forward around 1300 to justify the universal absolutist ambitions of the papacy. In particular, it appeared in the famous bull *Unam sanctam* (1302), which proclaimed the supremacy of the Apostolic See in reaction to the attacks of Philip the Fair. During the trials and investigations of 1301–14, the royal counselors began to tap into this theme for the profit of the Capetian king. The first manifestations of a conception of the kingdom of France as a mystical body do not seem to go back earlier than this, contrary to what the historiography often affirms, following E. Kantorowicz, on the sole basis of an expression of Vincent of Beauvais taken out of context and misinterpreted.

In the Saisset affair, Nogaret had thus presented the supposedly heretical bishop as a “rotten member” that the Capetian king had “to cut off from his kingdom, so that it did not corrupt the other parts of the body.” During the procedure against the Templars, on the other hand, the mystical body of the kingdom does not appear to have been a fruitful theme. The decisive idea for the affirmation of the autonomous body-church, hammered out by the royal counselors, was that God had affirmed with the Templar affair the distinction accorded to the kingdom of France among all others. This kingdom had been “specially chosen by the Lord for the defense of the catholic faith,” as it was worded in the letter of summons to the Estates General of 1312, assembled at Lyon to put pressure on the decision of the Council of Vienne.

The election of the kingdom resulted from that of the Capetian family. The process of the sacralization of royal power in France had certainly started very early, as is well known. The first traces go back to the reign of Robert the Pious, at the beginning of the eleventh century. Important stages passed at the time of Suger, under Louis VI and Louis VII, and then during the reigns of Philip Augustus and Saint Louis. The crucial evolutions that took place in this regard during the last third of the thirteenth century still need close study. The very special relationship maintained by the French monarchy with the papal theocracy during this period certainly played a major role. Still, it was toward the middle of the reign of Philip the Fair, at the moment of the conflict with the Apostolic See—particularly during its last act, the affair of the Templars—that the phenomenon took on the dimensions of a truly “royal religion.”

To conclude, Malcolm Barber and A. Demurger, like others before them, have already highlighted the ties between the affair of the Templars and
the conflict of the preceding years with Boniface VIII, but only as one explanatory element among others. They have not failed to point to the mysticism of Philip the Fair and his principal counselors or to note the new conception of the kingdom as a body directed by a most Christian king and vicar of Christ.96 William C. Jordan, in studying the 1306 expulsion of the Jews from France, intuited that the destruction of the Templars was not without mystical ties to this event and even suggested that this destruction was a “crowning achievement of the militant Christianity the French king had come to represent.”97 But to understand the decisive causes of the procedure against the Templars, to grasp the specific logic that alone explains the events in their specificity, it is necessary to foreground (and link) the question of the relations of the Capetian king and the papacy and that of the “royal religion.” It is especially necessary to locate, in the texts and in the procedures, the royal appropriation of the political/religious instruments honed by the pontifical theocracy.98

The Templar affair capped off the process of pontificalization of the Capetian king, which had entered a decisive phase several years earlier during the Saisset affair and subsequently with the accusations against Boniface VIII. The downfall of the Templars made Philip the Fair and his successors in some sense popes in their kingdom. When Jean Juvénal des Ursins reminded Charles VII in the fifteenth century that he was “vicar of God on earth,”99 he was only repeating an idea that Guillaume de Plaisians had proclaimed before Clement V at Poitiers in 1308 to justify the action of Philip the Fair against the “perfidious Templars.”

In short, the crimes attributed to the Templars constituted a heresy of state:100 these crimes served to construct a royal almightiness, just as heresy in general, defined as “divine lèse-majesté,” had served the construction of papal theocracy from the end of the twelfth century onward.101 The repression of the Templars’ heresy was an important moment for the rise of French royal absolutism, which initially took the form of a royal theocracy.

NOTES

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The research presented here is the subject of a book to be published with Perrin. It was begun in 2006 for the composition of my article “Procès des templiers,” in Prier et combattre, Dictionnaire européen des ordres militaires au Moyen Âge, ed. Nicole Bériou and Philippe Josserand (Paris: Fayard, 2009), 743–50 (see also “Contre-enquête sur un procès,” L’histoire 323 [2007]: 40–47). It progressed through presentations given at the seminar of Jacques Chiffolleau at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, April 26, 2007; a colloquium on L’État des procès, Inchieste e condanne tra politica e ideologia nel ’300, Ascoli, Istituto superiori di studi medievali “Cecco d’Ascoli,” November 30–December 1, 2007, organized by Antonio Rigon; the joint medieval seminar of the Université d’Orléans and the Section de diplomatique of the Institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, February 1, 2008, organized by Jean-Patrice Boudet and Paul Bertrand; and a journée d’études on La fin de l’ordre du Temple, Université Paul-Valéry Montpellier III, January 28, 2011, organized by Marie-Anna Chevalier. I also owe thanks to Yann Potin for stimulating conversations across the years and to Olivier Matéoni for his useful remarks on an earlier version of the text during a research supervision vita (“soutenance d’habilitation à diriger des recherches”), November 23, 2010, at the Université Paul-Valéry Montpellier III. Finally, I want to thank Henry A. Kelly, Sara McDougall, and the Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures’ anonymous reviewers for their remarks and suggestions.

1. This approach prevails, for example, in the recent publications of Barbara Frale; see, among other works, L’ultima battaglia dei Templari. Dal codice ombra d’obbedienza militare alla costruzione del processo per eresia (Rome: Viella, 2001). See also, in particular, Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Were the Templars Guilty?” in The Medieval Crusade, ed. Susan J. Ridyard (Woodbridge, England: Boydell, 2004), 107–24.


3. Although there is obviously some overlap with titles in the previous category, the principal editions of this type of source are Pierre Dupuy, Traitez concernant l’histoire de France, sçavoir la condamnation des Templiers avec quelques actes, l’histoire du schisme, les papes tenans le siege en l’arche et la condamnation des Templiers (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1901), 487–720; Heinrich Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens, vol. 2 (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907); Georges Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1923).


11. Guillaume de Paris, at the time of the Templar affair, was also the confessor of Philip the Fair (after having been his chaplain and confessor to the king’s sons). See Sean L. Field, The Beguine, the Angel, and the Inquisitor: The Trials of Marguerite Porete and Guiard of Cressonessart (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 63–84.

12. Demurger (“Manuscrit de Chillon ou ‘Moment Chillon?’”) gives a different interpretation of the chronology. For him, Clément V’s turning against the Templars happened later, in 1309 or 1310. Space does not permit discussion of this point here.

13. Riley-Smith (“Were the Templars Guilty?” 114) overestimates the importance of this accusation.

Thus Barbara Frale has compiled a large database that includes all the documented confessions and so claims to have created an important tool for clarifying the history of the trial (but this is an extreme case); see L’ultima battaglia dei Templari, especially at 169.


15. Alan Forey has recently sketched a detailed and convincing refutation of the hypotheses in question; see his “Could Alleged Templar Malpractices Have Remained Undetected for Decades?” in Burgdorf et al., Debate on the Trial of the Templars, 11–19; and “Were the Templars Guilty, Even If They Were Not Heretics or Apostates?” Viator 42, no. 2 (2011): 115–41. For my part, I would like to suggest here that these hypotheses were misguided in the first place.

16. See, for example, again ibid., 111–12: “What is striking about the records of many of these inquiries is the serious approach of the investigators.”


25. Barbara Frale, L’ultima battaglia dei Templari, for instance, at 192.


27. Regarding the persistence of such methods, note that Michele himself, based on his reading of the depositions, built up a theory according to which a ritual denial of Christ was indeed imposed on Templars at the time of their entry into the order, but only to test their obedience or to prepare them for possible capture by the Saracens (a theory that “does not stand up to examination,” in the words of Nicholson [Brief History of the Knights Templars, 24]).

29. Octave Mannoni, “Je sais bien, mais quand même,” Les temps modernes 212 (1964), reprinted in Clefs pour l’imaginaire ou l’autre scène (Paris: Le Seuil, 1985), 9–33 (in the last analysis, such an attitude is caused by the unconscious refusal of symbolic castration). See, for example, here again, the approach in Riley-Smith, “Were the Templars Guilty?” 116, on testimonies concerning the sacrilegious acts supposed to have accompanied the ritual of reception: “The evidence they [the witnesses] gave was not consistent and in each case it is hard to tell whether it was true, or invented (or imagined) by the individual concerned, or the product of discussion with other brothers while in prison. Nevertheless a broad pattern emerges” (the author does not see that this “pattern” could simply be imposed by the accusations and by the perspective of the judges); or again, 117: “Anyone reading the interrogations carefully is left unsure and perplexed, or should be. Nevertheless, I have been struck by the way certain themes run through them and by comments from witnesses which sound so circumstantial that they could hardly have been invented.”


34. The pope even had a group of nine Templars, who had unexpectedly come before the council with the intention of pleading the order’s cause, thrown in prison.


36. Ibid., 499.

37. Ubl (“Philipp IV. und die Vernichtung des Tempeleords”) recently gave yet another refutation of this hypothesis and showed that the royal sequestration of the order’s properties was meant to put more pressure on the pope in order to have the Templars judged and condemned by the Church.


40. See note 8.


42. See notes 7 and 8.

43. On the subject of the category of enormitas, forged in the twelfth century in the practices of the papal government and used by secular jurisdictions from the thirteenth century on, see Théry, “Atrocitas/enormitas.”

44. See on this subject the classic study of Michele Maccarone, Vicarius Christi. Storia del titolo papale (Rome: Lateranum, 1952).

45. On the theocracy in general and the plenitudo potestatis in particular, the bibliography is immense. Here I can merely cite the fine article of Walter Ullmann, “The Significance of Innocent III’s Decretal Vergentis,” in Études d’histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel Le Bras, vol. 3 (Paris: Sirey, 1965), 729–41.


47. “Que [the crimes of heresy attributed to Bernard Saisset] gravius longe dictus dominus rex recipit quam superius expressata que contra regiam majestatem commissit dictus episcopus,
of the king has alleged that the lord King should be adored as the terrestrial lord, we leave
Plaisians—with, among others, an article written in these terms: "Item, although the advocate
responded to the arguments advanced by the king’s advocate—none other than Guillaume de
Mende to impose royal jurisdiction on his temporal domain (1307), an episcopal jurist had
worth placing a short excursus here. A few months earlier, during a procedure with the bishop
ecclesie juxta traditiones patrum sanctorum, de qua tenetur Deo reddere rationem." It is
accusator, sed ut Dei minister, pugil fidei catholice, leges divine zelator, ad deffensionem
in Lizerand,
ipse est princeps devotissimus et christianissimus, potentissimus et ditissimus."

Dei est Dei vicarius in temporalibus, et certo nullus ad hoc magis idoneus inveniri potuisset; nam
Dei clementiam providentem magistrum et propter Dei sapientiam ordinantem processum.
in progressu propter tria, videlicet propter Dei providentiam eligentem ministrum, propter
Guillewm seriose prosecutus est qualiter victoria illa de qua predixit fuit jocunda et mirabilis
Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens
142: "Et postquam de hiis locutus est, idem dominus
rex predictus, qui et sui progenitores defensores speciales fidei et honoris Romane Ecclesie
semper fuerunt” (Pierre Dupuy, Histoire du différend d’entre le pape Boniface VIII et Philippeus roy
Filippo il Bello di Francia e Bonifacio VIII,” 53; cf. the new edition given in Denton, “Bernard
Saisset and the Franco-Papal Rift of December 1301,” 415–26, at 421).

1854), 5–7: “Tanto ipsor [the heretics] persequeamur instantius quanto in evidentiorum
injuriam fidei christianie, prope Romanam Ecclesiam . . . superstitionis sue scelera latius
exercere noscuntur; immo crimen lese majestatis nostre debet ab omnibus horribilium
jucdicii potestate alter alterum non excedat.” See on this subject Ernst Kantorowicz, Frederick II, 1194–
1250 (1927; London: Constable, 1931), in particular 222–36. In this regard, it is very important
to note that Register JJ28 of the French Archives Nationales, which was probably compiled
for Nogaret, includes copies of Peter de Vinea’s letters (my thanks go to Elizabeth A. R. Brown
for drawing my attention to this register). Peter de Vinea was Frederick II’s chancellor and
inspired the emperor’s ideological posture.

49. Ernst Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State. An Absolutist Concept and Its Late Medieval Origins”

50. See, on this subject, Julien Théry, “Philippe le Bel, pape en son royame,” L’histoire 289

51. Coste, Boniface VIII en procès, 115: “Vobis excellentissimo principi, domino Philippi, Dei
gratia Francorum regi, supplico, ut, sicut angelus Domini prophete Balaam, antiquitus qui ad
maledicendum populo Domini procedebat, occurrat gladio evaginato in via, sic dicto pestiferro,
qui longe pejor est dicto Balaam, vos qui unctus estis ad executionem justitie, et ideo sicut
angelus Dei, minister potestatis et officii vestri, gladio evaginato occurrere velitis, ne possit
malum populii perficere quod intendit.” For a juridical approach to the accusations against
the pope, see Tilmann Schmidt, Der Bonifaz-Prozess. Verfahren der Papstanklage in der Zeit
Bonifaz VIII. und Clemens V. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1989).

52. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens, 307–9, at 308: “Adjicemis insuper
verbis lamentabulismis et corde contricto, ut ibidem astantibus videbatur, quod predicta
facinora, quod propter pene temporalis timorem, et ne destrueretur ordo predictus, in quo casu
amitterent honores mundanos, status et divitias quos habebant, hactenus noluerant revelare,
facinora, que propter pene temporalis timorem, et ne destrueretur ordo predictus, in quo casu
verbis lamentabilibus et corde contricto, ut ibidem astantibus videbatur, quod predicta
facinora, quod propter pene temporalis timorem, et ne destrueretur ordo predictus, in quo casu
amitterent honores mundanos, status et divitias quos habebant, hactenus noluerant revelare,
mediante christianissimi principis domini Philippi, Dei gracia Francorum regi, supplico, ut, sicut angelus
Domini prophete Balaam, antiquitus qui ad
maledicendum populo Domini procedebat, occurrat gladio evaginato in via, sic dicto pestiferro,
qui longe pejor est dicto Balaam, vos qui unctus estis ad executionem justitie, et ideo sicut
angelus Dei, minister potestatis et officii vestri, gladio evaginato occurrere velitis, ne possit
malum populii perficere quod intendit.” For a juridical approach to the accusations against
the pope, see Tilmann Schmidt, Der Bonifaz-Prozess. Verfahren der Papstanklage in der Zeit
Bonifaz VIII. und Clemens V. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1989).

53. Picot, Documents inédits relatifs aux États généraux, 488: “Vobis nichilominus intimantes
nos prosecuturo et promoturos negocium Christi predictum, prout ad Christi desideratum
obsequium ac ad nostram regiam majestatem dignoscitur pertinere.”

54. Ibid., 487–88: “Caritatem vestram in Domino excitantes et nichilominus sub fideltatis
vinculo quo Deo nobisque tenemini, qui gerimus Ejus negocium in hac parte, vobis
injungentes.”

55. See note 47.

56. According to the account of the discourse by an Aragonese witness, edited in Finke,
Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens, 142: “Et postquam de his locutus est, idem dominus
Guillermus seriose prosecutus est qualiter victoria illa de qua predixit fuit jocunda et mirabils
in progressu propter tria, videlicet propter Dei providentiam eligentem ministrum, propter
Dei elementiam providentiam magistrum et propter Dei sapientiam ordinantem processum.
Dei providentia elegit ad hoc negocium ministrum sclacet regem Francie, qui in regno suo
Dei est vicarius in temporalibus, et certo nullus ad hoc magis idoneus inveniri potuisse; nam
ipse est princeps devotissimus et christianissimus, potentissimus et dittissimus.”

57. According to the text of the discourse preserved in the Trésor des chartes and published
in Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers, 126: “Rex catholicus, rex Francorum, non ut
accusator, sed ut Dei minister, pulig fidei catholice, leges divine zelator, ad defensionem
ecclesie juxta traditiones patrum sanktorum, de qua tenetur Deo reddere rationem.” It is
worth placing a short excursus here. A few months earlier, during a procedure with the bishop
of Mende to impose royal jurisdiction on his temporal domain (1307), an episcopal jurist had
responded to the arguments advanced by the king’s advocate—none other than Guillaume de
Plaisians—with, among others, an article written in these terms: “Item, although the advocate
of the king has alleged that the lord King should be adored as the terrestrial lord, we leave
this to the heretics whose heresy is damned in the canon Quidam heretici, since we adore only the celestial God, Creator of heaven and earth” (“Item, licet advocatus regius allegaverit dominus regem adorandum esse sicut Dominum terrestrem, hereticis quorum heresio dampnata est in c. Quidam heretici hoc reliquimus, cum Deum celestem, Creatorem celestium et terrestrium, tantummodo adoramus” [Mémoire relatif au parage de 1307, vol. 1, ed. Abel Maisonné [Mende, France, 1896–97], 532]). Antoine Meissonnier, who completed in 2011 a thesis at the École des chartes dedicated to the parage of Mende in 1307, was kind enough to bring this passage to my attention, for which I extend my deep thanks. This reference to the Decretum of Gratian (C.24, q. 5, c. 39, in Corpus iuris canonici. Pars I. Decretum Gratiani, ed. Emil Friedberg [Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879], cols. 1001–6) did not lack insolence—or humor. The canon Quidam heretici, taken from the Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, enumerated in an interminable list all the heresies known in late antiquity, with their various characteristics. We do not know the exact tenor of the allegations to which the memorandum produced by the bishop of Mende was responding here. The idea of “adoration” of the king is assuredly an ironic reformulation of Plaisians pretentions (the stigmatizing verb “to adore” was reserved for heretics and could not have been employed by the légiste himself). One may still be inclined to believe that the episcopal jurist was exaggerating only a little, when one considers the tone of the texts written by the counselors of Philip the Fair during the major diplomatic affairs of 1301–14. There is no doubt, in any case, that Plaisians had given free rein to his mysticism of royal power in the Mende affair. The article of the episcopal memorandum derides this religious exaltation of Capetian authority while suggesting—probably with a mixture of humor and fear—that it constituted a deviance comparable to one or another of the heresies mentioned in the largest canonical repertoire of this kind. There are many other examples of this religious exaltation in royal documents written in this first decade of the fourteenth century. See, for instance, Archives Nationales, J266/48, dated 1308: “Regalis pre cunctis ceteris vobis francia majestas pleno jure divinitus est collata, cuius egressio solum a summo celo immediate processit, vos, re[dx] Francorum et dominu[s] special[is], vos, publice justicie debitor specialiter a Domino constitutu[s].” (I am now studying this document, which is related to the annexation of Lyon, together with Sébastien Nadiras.) See also Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “Moral Imperatives and Conundrums of Conscience: Reflections on Philip the Fair,” Speculum 87, no. 1 (2012): 1–36.

58. Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers, 116: “Christus videtur miraculose egisse ut vos de regno Francie a Domino electo et benedicto pre ceteris regnis mundi apostoli Petri successorem assumpserit vosque in regno predicto presencialiter cum curia vestra in regno predicto adessitis cum rege et ipsum vobis et duos sibi corde et corporali presencia conjunxerit ut utriusque virtus simul unita constanter debellaret pro ipso.”


60. Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers, 18: “Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum novissimis temporebus pro humani generis redemptione crucifixum, gravioribus quam in cruce pertulit illatis injuriis, iterum crucificuit.”


62. Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers, 111: “Post illam universalem victoriam quam ipsum Dominus Ihesus Christus fecit in ligno Crucis contra hostem antiquum pro defensione ecclesie sue et humani generis redemptione . . . non fecit aliquam particularum victoriam contra inimicos sue ecclesie et fidei orthodoxae, ita miram et magnam et strenuam, ita utilem et necessariam, sicut fecit novissime hiis diebus.”

63. The question of whether Philip the Fair and his counselors were fully and sincerely convinced of the Templars’ guilt, which K. Ubl ultimately sees as a central issue in his recent reconsideration of the affair (“Philipp IV. und die Vernichtung des Templeordens”), I think is actually, in the end, of little importance. According to Ubl, no matter if the Templars were innocent or guilty, it would be “dangerous” to consider that Philip and his counselors were driven in this case by anything other than good faith. The king’s deeply religious worldview,
which is well documented, should prohibit one from regarding as “hypocritical” the rhetoric used extensively by his entourage to justify the persecution of the Templars and to promote at the same time the salutary leadership of the Capetian at the head of Christendom. To this one can reply that the degrees of sincerity and conviction of the king and of his légistes certainly varied and are nowadays even more elusive than they were at the time; that the analysis should not be limited to rhetoric, regardless of acts caused and justified by speech; and most of all that it is not a good method (and perhaps a little naive) to search in terms of individual intentions for keys to understanding events that deeply involved the political and institutional structures of their time. Moreover, if no secularization occurred in France as a consequence of the affair, as Ubl well notes, it should be seen that the Templar case was actually important for an opposite process: the sacralization of royal power (which, in this case, could also be described as a process of “theocratization”). In rejecting interpretations centered on the terms and objective effects of the affair, for the sake of Philip’s supposed sincerity, Ubl might be driven by the above-mentioned tendency to legitimate the actions of state power (a tendency found, as is above suggested, in historians who are inclined to detect evidence against the Templars in the proceedings of the trial).

64. Picot, Documents inédits relatifs aux États généraux, 487: “Secta damnumabilis quin pocius ex se ipsa damnata, vulpium collegium colore religionis opertum, Antechristi tenens substanciam”; and 490: “Scitis quod fides est catholica ex qua id quod sumus in Christo consistimus . . . ; hoc est ergo tota nostra substantia.” The Antichrist had already been mentioned, at least three times, in texts written against Boniface VIII: in Pierre Dubois’s Déliberation and in a letter sent by the kingdom’s nobility to the cardinals, both dated 1302 (Dupuy, Histoire du différend, 47, 62; cf. Coste, Boniface VIII en procès, 92–93), and then in a memo written in 1304 by Nogaret to justify his accusations against Boniface and the arrest in Anagni (Dupuy, Histoire du différend, 270: “Si enim, nostris pecatss exigitentibus, aliquis Antichristus, a fide catholica devius, Petri locum pseudo-apostolus locum Christi per fallaciam se figendo catholicum est ingressus”).


69. Nadiras, “Guillaume de Nogaret en ses dossiers,” II, 774–76 (Nogaret wrote a memo about the affair dated 1308).

70. Josep Perarnau i Espelt, “Sobre la primera crisi entorn el De Adventu antichristi d’Arnau de Vilanova: Paris 1299–1300,” Arxiu de Textos catalans antics 20 (2001): 349–402; Josep Perarnau i Espelt, “Sobre l’estada d’Arnau de Vilanova a Paris, 1299–1300: Les dues dates dels textos,” Arxiu de Textos catalans antics 28 (2009): 623–28; McVaugh, “Arnau de Vilanova and Paris.” The itinerary of Guillaume de Nogaret as it was recently established by S. Nadiras (“Itinéraire de Guillaume de Nogaret: Les déplacements du légiste,” in Moreau, Guillaume de Nogaret, 169–73), it seems, should bring the discussion about the date of Arnau’s stay in Paris to an end: Nogaret was in Languedoc at the end of 1299, whereas he was in Paris at the end of the following year; thus the arrest and release of Arnau must have taken place at the end of 1300, as it was recently argued by McVaugh (“Arnau de Vilanova and Paris”).


72. It is known that Arnau gave a copy of his De tempore to the chancellor of the University of Paris (McVaugh, “Arnau de Vilanova and Paris,” 38), which was what led to his being
denounced to the bishop’s official. Might this copy have then ended up in the hands of Nogaret, or might Nogaret have received another copy from Arnau? As for the De cymbalis, Arnau sent four copies of it to Paris at the end of 1301 (the dedicatory letters are edited and studied in Joaquín Carreras Artau, “Del epistolario espiritual de Arnaldo de Vila Nueva,” Estudios Franciscanos 49 [1948]: 79–94, 391–406, at 392–99, 405–6; cf. Mathias Kaup and Robert E. Lerner, “Gentile of Foligno Interprets the Prophecy ‘Woe to the World,’” Traditio 56 [2001]: 149–211, at 156).


78. See on this subject Théry, “Philippe le Bel, pape en son royaume.”


80. 1 Sam. 2:12–36, 418.

81. Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers, 136: “Aliter vicinorum ruent parietes, domus comburnentur vosque, quod absit, timere poteritis sentenciam Heli, summi sacerdotis, qui cathedra fractis cervicibus expriravit.”

82. See, for example, Wim Blockmans, “Representation (Since the Thirteenth Century),” in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. VII, ed. Christopher Allmand (Cambridge:


85. This conception had a long future ahead of it; it became a commonplace by the second half of the fourteenth century. Jean Gerson, for example, evoked it often, as underlined in Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 218–19. See also Jacques Krynen, L’Empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe–XVIe siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 242–53.

86. Vincent de Beauvais, Speculum doctrinale [v. 1257], VII, c. 15, ed. Douai (1624), 566. The corpus rei publice mysticum refers here to the entirety of Christendom, without separating out a secular—let alone a national—entity. Kantorowicz cites this passage from a misleading reference by Otto von Gierke (and moreover indicates that he has not read the text). He was mistaken in affirming that “for Vincent of Beauvais the secular entity itself was a ‘mystical body’” (The King’s Two Bodies, 222). In fact, the Dominican encyclopedist does not add anything notable to the traditional conception of society as a body, an organic idea that he takes from Helinand de Froidmont (and, through him, from Plutarch and Aristotle). Vincent only labels the social corpus as mysticum once and seems to use the adjective to underline the metaphorical character of the term, without giving it a particularly marked religious dimension (and certainly not within a logic of secularization or nationalization that would separate a body of the kingdom of France from the rest of Christendom and/or give to the Capetian king a spiritual responsibility superior to that of the pope). The insignificant character of this occurrence is confirmed by the absence of any particular mystical dimension in the presentation of the corpus rei publice, which is the object of the first chapter of the De principiis morali institutione, finished in 1263 by the same Vincent of Beauvais: Vincentii Brevae nec non principis institutione, ed. Robert J. Schneider (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1995); on this work, see Krynen, L’Empire du roi, 173–75. To my knowledge, there is no evidence of an idea of the corpus mysticum regni from the thirteenth century in France. Moreover, it seems probable to me that Kantorowicz dates too early the phenomenon of the sacralization of the body politic (even if it is here only a question of ideas shared by intellectuals and not principles worked out in the practices of the government) when he writes that “before the end of the thirteenth century secular communities, large and small, were to be defined as ‘mystical bodies’” (Ernst Kantorowicz, “Pro patria mori in Medieval Political Thought” [1951], in Kantorowicz, Selected Studies, 308–24, at 320) or when he affirms that the “equation” between the corpus reipublicae mysticum, headed by the Prince, and the “corpus ecclesiae mysticum, headed by Christ,” became customary “around the middle of the thirteenth century” (“Mysteries of State,” 391).

87. The text is cited and commented upon in Théry, “Allo scoppio del conflitto tra Filippo il Bello di Francia e Bonifacio VIII,” 56.

88. Cf., among numerous other examples, Lizerand, Le dossier de l’affaire des Templiers, 116: “Vos, de regno Francie a Domino electo et benedicto pre ceteris regnis mundi.”


91. And one can find there a confirmation of the fact that ”in France, the state created the
nation,” as suggested in Bernard Guenée, “État et nation en France au Moyen Âge,” Revue
92. Marc Bloch, The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France
(1924; London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1973); Georges Duby, The Legend of Bouvines: War,
Religion, and Culture in the Middle Ages (1973; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990);
Andrew W. Lewis, Royal Succession in Capetian France: Studies on Family Order and the State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Colette Beaune, The Birth of an Ideology: Myths
and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France (1985; Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991); Chiara Mercuri, Corona di Cristo, corona di re. La monarchia francese e la corona di spine
93. In this respect, Elizabeth A. R. Brown’s work on the French monarchy at the time of
Philip the Fair and his successors provides many important suggestions. See, among others, her “Philip
the Fair and the Remains of Saint Louis,” Gazette des Beaux-Arts, 1980–81: 175–82; “’The Prince
Is Father of the King’: The Character and Childhood of Philip the Fair of France,” Mediaeval
The Case of Philip the Fair,” Viator 19 (1988): 219–46. See also M. Cecilia Gaposchkin,
”Boniface VIII, Philip the Fair, and the Sanctity of Louis IX,” Journal of Medieval History 28
in the Late Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
94. To suggest this, I will limit myself here to citing the words addressed by Plaisiants to
Clement V, June 14, 1308: “Et certe, pater sanctorum, non displicat vobis, plus deconstat Ecclesia
Dei regi Francie quam vobis. Nam multi progenitores sua regis Francisco fuderunt sanguinem suum pro fide Christi et Ecclesia Dei. Et ne remota quernas exemplum, avus suus sancte
memorie sanctus Lodovicus mortuus est prosequendo negocium exaltationis fidei. Rex etiam
Philippus, pater istius regis, mortuus est in servitio Ecclesie. Barones etiam et populi illustri regni pro Ecclesia Dei fuderunt sanguinem suum. Et in predictorum regum et aliorum
sanguine exalta est et radicata Ecclesia Dei et etiam fundata” (Finke, Papsttum und Untergang
des Templerordens, 146).
95. Cf. among others, Strayer, ”France”; Jacques Le Goff, Histoire de la France. La longue durée
de l’État (Paris: Le Seuil, 1988), especially at 141–46; Jacques Krynen, ”Rex christianissimus: A
Medieval Theme at the Roots of French Absolutism,” History and Anthropology 4 (1989):
79–96; Krynen, L’Empire du roi, 145–83; Elizabeth A. R. Brown, ”Kings like Semi-gods: The
Case of Louis X of France,” Majestas 1 (1993): 5–37; or, most recently, Martin Kintzinger,
”Symbolique du sacre, succession royale et participation politique en France au XIVe siècle,”
royale in the ancient sense of a religious condition specific to the king (and not of cultic forms
around his person) is employed by Jean Golein in his Traité du sacre in 1372: ”La Traité du
96. Malcolm Barber, ”The World Picture of Philip the Fair,” Journal of Medieval History
Roman de Fauvel, for example, associated the expulsion of the Jews and the destruction of the
Order of the Temple (as did many other narrative texts of the period). Moreover, the author
praises Philip the Fair for his action against the Templars; he considers that ”even saint Louis,
in his glory, hadn’t done so good” and adds: ”He did his duty very well / With diligence,
like a prud’homme / Before the apostle of Rome / Has proceeded to this task” (“Tres bien
en a fait son devoir / Diligaument comme prudomme / Devant l’apostolle de Romme /
Didot, 1914–19), vv. 999–1002 and 1009–13; Le roman de Fauvel, ed. Armand Strubel (Paris:
98. If the three affairs of 1301–14 were privileged moments for the appropriation of the
language and the governmental techniques of the papacy, the phenomenon had certainly
begun earlier, in a more diffuse manner. To stick to the reign of Philip the Fair and a very
telling element, one can give as an example the appearance of references to a plenitudo
potestatis of the king in chancellery documents beginning in 1297, studied in Jacques Krynen,
”De nostre certaine science . . . ’ Remarques sur l’absolutisme législatif de la monarchie
médiévale française,” in Renaissance du pouvoir législatif et genèse de l’État, ed. André Gouron and Albert Rigaudière (Montpellier: Société d’histoire du droit et des institutions des anciens pays de droit écrit, 1988), 131–44 (the very first occurrence of this formula in a royal text is found in Saint Louis’s 1254 reform ordinance; but only from the second half of Philip the Fair’s reign was it currently used). See also Olivier Guyotjeannin, “Traces d’influence pontificale dans les actes épiscopaux et royaux français (XIIIe–XIVe s.),” in Papsturkunde und europäisches Urkundenwesen: Studien zu ihrer formalen und rechtlichen Kohärenz vom 11. bis 15. Jahrhundert, ed. Peter Herde and Hermann Jakobs (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), 337–64; Hans Günther Schmidt, “Der Einfluß der päpstlichen Justizbriefe auf die Justizbriefe der französischen Königskanzlei um 1300,” in Herde and Jakobs, Papsturkunde und europäisches Urkundenwesen, 365–93.

